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Abstract. Relative distinguishing margins are becoming a popular mea-
sure for comparing distinguishers. This paper presents some examples
that show that this measure, although informative and intuitively sound,
should not be taken alone as benchmark of distinguishers.
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in [3], several differ-
ent statistical tools called distinguishers have been proposed. Some distinguish-
ers claim to be more efficient assuming a leakage model (like CPA [1]) or more
generic (MIA [2] and KS [13]). A recurring topic in the literature is the need
for establishing fair criteria to compare distinguishers and extract broad con-
clusions, more generally applicable than the comparison of outcomes in specific
empirical experiments.
The notion of success rate is of extended use to evaluate distinguishers, prob-
ably due to the accessible interpretation of the measure. One of the first works
theoretically analyzing the behavior of several univariate distinguishers is pre-
sented by Mangard et al. in [7]. They show that the (asymptotic) efficiency,
measured as the success rate, of distinguishers based on the correlation coeffi-
cient, difference of means and Gaussian templates are essentially the same, given
the exact (single-bit) model of the power consumption. This result, however, does
not generalize to higher-order attacks as shown by Standaert et al. in [10]. Said
work shows that in the context of attacking masked implementations, the choice
of distinguisher indeed highly affects the success rate achieved in the attack.
However, measures other than the success rate have also been proposed in
previous works. Most notably, Whitnall and Oswald formalized the concept of
theoretical margins for a distinguisher in [11,12]. This measure provides an im-
provement and generalization of several other measures [4,5], and it was shown to
be more expressive and informative than the success rate [11]. In short, the rel-
ative margin measures to what extent the distinguisher value for the correct key
hypothesis stands out over other competing distinguisher values, in a normalized
fashion.
In the same series of papers [8,11,12], Whitnall et al. introduce a very interest-
ing idea towards separating the intrinsic distinguishing power of a distinguisher
from estimation inaccuracies, both of which affect the success rate. To isolate
these two aspects, the distinguisher values are not estimated but directly com-
puted from the probability densities of the simulated leakage via numerical inte-
gration. In this approach, the estimation problem (which for some distinguishers
is notoriously hard) is worked around. Whitnall et al. apply this technique to
theoretically compare several distinguishers and draw the conclusion that MIA
and KSA distinguishers have theoretical advantages over CPA and that the un-
derperformance of MIA-like attacks frequently observed in practice is due to
estimation errors.
Theoretical margins are receiving an increasing adoption. Recent works have
proposed new distinguishers and justified somehow their superiority based on
theoretical margin measures [6,13].
Contribution. This paper presents simple counterexamples of distinguishers that
exhibit the exact same success rate, yet their theoretical margins’ values can be
almost arbitrarily different. Hence, theoretical margins should not be used as
the sole measure to compare distinguishers.
Notation. A distinguisher is the statistical tool that is used to compare mea-
surements T to key-dependent predictions Zk in a standard DPA attack. The
distinguisher vector D(k) is a vector containing distinguisher values for each
subkey k. In the simulations of this paper we assume that the leakage T consists
of the Hamming weight of the first DES Sbox output Z with additive Gaussian
noise, that is T = HW(Zk)+  with Zk = DES-Sbox1(p⊕k). The signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) is defined as var [HW(Zk)]var [] .
Organization. In Section 2 we present the main idea: several distinguishers are
proposed that serve our purpose of showing that taking only the margins into
account can lead to misjudgment. In Section 3 we study the behavior of the
distinguishers when noise is present.
2 Two distinguishers
In this section, we present two distinguishers D1 and D2 that by construction
behave exactly in the same way in practice. That is, the two distinguishers will
rank key candidates in exactly the same way: the attack using D1 will be exactly
as successful as the attack using D2. However, the relative and absolute margins
for D1 and D2 are different.
2.1 Description
The first distinguisher D1 is the absolute value of Kocher et al. single bit DPA
between measurements T and key-dependent predictions Zk. That is, for each
hypothesis k of the key, the distinguisher computes
D1(k) =
∣∣∣Ê(T |L(Zk) = 1)− Ê(T |L(Zk) = 0)∣∣∣ (1)
where L is a function that extracts one bit from the predictions and Ê is the
sample mean operator. The second distinguisher D2 is based on D1. It computes
the squared version of D1 as
D2(k) = [D1(k)]
2
(2)
=
∣∣∣Ê(T |L(Zk) = 1)− Ê(T |L(Zk) = 0)∣∣∣2 . (3)
2.2 Properties
It is not hard to see that D1 and D2 are in essence the same distinguisher. For
any two key hypothesis, D1 will rank them in the same way as D2. This means
that an attack using D1 will be exactly as successful as one using D2. One
can see D2 as the composition of first computing D1 and then squaring every
distinguisher value (i.e., applying the map x 7→ x2), as Figure 1 (left) shows.
Since the map x 7→ x2 is strictly increasing in x ≥ 0 (possible values of D1 will
be always D1 ≥ 0), it follows from the definition that the order (key ranking)
will be preserved. However, as we will see in the next section, D1 and D2 have
different theoretical relative margins. (
2.3 Margins for D1 and D2
For a given distinguisher that produces the distinguishing vector D, the relative
distinguishing margin1 is defined as
RelMargin(D) =
D(k∗)−max [D(k)|k 6= k∗]
std(D)
(4)
where k∗ is the correct key and std is the sample standard deviation. The
sign of this measure indicates whether an attack using the given distinguisher
and a “large enough” number of traces would be successful (or not), and the
magnitude of the measure, up to what extend the attack was successful (or not.)
In what follows, we computed all relative margins by numerical integration as
suggested in [12].
We computed the theoretical relative distinguishing margin for D1 and D2
and got, respectively, 0.250 and 0.5176 in a noiseless scenario. Both are positive,
which means that the attacks would be successful, given enough traces. The
fact that the two magnitudes are different means that the theoretical relative
distinguishing margin is, in this situation, measuring something that does not
relate to the intrinsic distinguishing ability of D1 or D2, since it is clear that by
construction both distinguishers behave identically.
We push further our study by introducing another pair of distinguishersDMIA1
and DMIA2 . The distinguisher D
MIA
1 is MIA and is defined as
DMIA1 = I(T ;L
′(Zk)) (5)
1 We note that the distinction between theoretical distinguishing margins and distin-
guishing margins is orthogonal to the observations in this paper, and the conse-
quences affect both.
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Fig. 1. Left: construction of D1 and D2. Right: relative distinguishing margins for D1
and D2. Pink ◦: margins for D1. Green : margins for D2. Blue +: margins for DMIA1 .
Red x: margins for DMIA2 .
where I(·; ·) denotes Mutual Information and L′ is some leakage model. Anal-
ogously, we define DMIA2 as the squared version of D
MIA
1 :
DMIA2 =
[
DMIA1 (k)
]2
(6)
= |I(T ;L′(Zk))|2 . (7)
We computed theoretical margins for D1, D2, D
MIA
1 and D
MIA
2 as a function
of the SNR and plot them in Figure 1 (right.) We note that the results of the
margin of DMIA1 coincide with those from [12]
2. As expected, the margins for D1
and D2 stay constant as the SNR progresses. For the difference of means based
distinguishers, noise affects every distinguisher value in the same way, keeping
the theoretical distinguishing ability unaffected. For the distinguishers based on
MIA the situation is different: margins for DMIA1 and D
MIA
2 vary as the SNR
changes, as [12] pointed out.
From the observation of Figure 1 it is clear that all distinguishers D1, D2,
DMIA1 and D
MIA
2 have distinct margins, albeit D1 (respectively D
MIA
1 ) is es-
sentially the same as D2 (respectively D
MIA
2 ). Thus, we see that margins do
not necessarily relate to success rate. We would incur a misjudgment if based
on Figure 1 and without any more information we assess that distinguisher D2
has more intrinsic distinguishing abilities than D1. Furthermore, by the same
reasoning, from the observation of Figure 1 there is not enough information to
claim that distinguisher DMIA2 has more intrinsic distinguishing abilities than
D2, which is a different distinguisher not based on MIA. In the next section we
elaborate on the applicability of margins to compare distinguishers.
Note that the observation regarding different margins for DMIA1 and D
MIA
2
will hold in a theoretical scenario (where there are no estimation errors) as well
2 Up to a typo in the caption of Figure 2 in [12].
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Fig. 2. Red, blue, green: margins for DMIAa,b for several choices: red, ‘+‘: a = 1.9, b = 7;
blue, ‘x‘: a = 0, b = 1 (this means that D0,1 = D1); green, ‘o‘: a = 0.3, b = 0.003. Pink,
: margins for Df(x) with f(x) = ex if x < 0.05 and f(x) = 10ex+1 otherwise (f(x) is
strictly increasing in x > 0.
as in a practical scenario (since the estimation errors will affect DMIA1 and D
MIA
2
in exactly the same way).
3 Discussion
3.1 The shape of the margins is also different
Upon the observation of Section 2.3, one might ask if the properties of the margin
are the same for DMIA1 and D
MIA
2 as the SNR varies . In other words, whether
the relative margin for DMIA2 is just a scaled version of D
MIA
1 . In this section,
we answer this question negatively.
We slightly generalize the construction of DMIA2 . We consider the family of
distinguishers DMIAa,b . This family is constructed akin to D
MIA
2 but substituting
the squaring mapping x 7→ x2 with a different strictly increasing non-linear
mapping x 7→ (x+ a)b − ab for some a, b > 0. Since the mapping is still strictly
increasing in x ≥ 0, all the distinguishers in the family are essentially the same.
We further generalize and also consider the family of distinguishers DMIAf(x) that
is constructed similarly to DMIA2 but with a generic strictly increasing non-linear
mapping x 7→ f(x). We note that linear mappings of the form x 7→ a ·x+b would
not modify relative margins (and will of course lead to attacks with identical
success rates.)
In Figure 2 we plot the theoretical relative distinguishing margin for some
members of the family of distinguishers previously defined. We can see that the
evolution of the relative margin as a function of the SNR can be almost arbitrary,
even though all the distinguishers in the figure are essentially the same (they
relate to the same distinguisher up to a strictly increasing non-linear mapping
at their output). Thus, one should also be skeptical about drawing conclusions
about the behavior of a specific distinguisher from the observation of the shape
of the relative distinguishing margin as the SNR varies. In Figure 2, one could
assert from the curve corresponding to DMIA0,1 (blue, ‘x‘) that there is a stochastic-
resonance-like effect around SNR=10 since the margin achieves a maximum. We
note that the very same effect does not exhibit itself for the other equivalent
distinguisher in the figure (red, ‘+‘; and green, ‘o‘.) Therefore, margins alone
should not be used to assess the properties of a distinguisher as the SNR varies:
distinguisher-specific properties may or may not show in the margins.
3.2 Objection: D2 is pathologic
One could argue that the construction of appending a non-linear mapping at
the output of a previously proposed distinguisher is pathologic. Although D2
(and subsequent generalizations) was specifically crafted to show the point in
this paper regarding relative distinguishing margins and no reasonable person
would think that it is any better (or worse) than D1, we remark that the derived
distinguishers are as sound as the original ones. For example, D2 is as sound as
D1 and still gives a measure of the degree of the correlation between random
variables (only in a different scale than D1), and is as precise as D1.
3.3 What is left to compare distinguishers?
The task of comparing in a fair way several distinguishers that work on different
scales seems hard. One could resort to the well-known success-rate metric, albeit
one should be aware of its limitations. Namely, success rates are highly depen-
dent on the statistical estimator used in the computation of the distinguisher
values. Besides, once the signal-to-noise ratio is high enough so that the distin-
guishers under study behave well (they output the correct key hypothesis with
high probability, i.e., their success rates reach values close to 1), it becomes hard
to compare distinguishers and rank which one is better, since their success rates
are all close to 1. On the bright side, success rates are easily computable in em-
pirical settings and can be used to compare distinguishers that work on different
scales. The same observations apply to other metrics that are only sensitive to
the ordering of the distinguishing vector, such as guessing entropy [9].
4 Conclusion
We showed in this paper that the theoretical relative distinguishing margin can
be a useful measure but is not to be used as the sole measure to compare dis-
tinguishers, and to assess properties of a specific distinguisher. Although the
measure is intuitively useful, and in many cases it informs of useful properties
of distinguishers, there are some counterexamples/corner cases shown in this
paper where the measure should not be taken solely to judge the behavior of a
distinguisher.
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